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COMPLEXITY IN COALITION OPERATIONS: THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SIXTH COALITION AGAINST NAPOLEON
The Campaign of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon, from the summer of 1813 to the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, offers invaluable insights into the successful conduct of coalition warfare and provides an exceptional example of the complexities inherent in coalition operations. As the United States continues to rely on the use of coalitions as a major component of our national strategy when committing military forces, it is important for military leaders to understand these complexities as well as how to successfully work within a coalition.
Authors often cite this campaign as an example of how to wage coalition warfare. Many of these published works focus on the aspects of unity of command, strategic purpose, and execution of the strategic plan. 1 While these aspects are important, the campaign also provides an example of the importance of a lead nation in the coalition, capable of providing the major military forces, as well as the strategic leadership, to ensure the successful pursuit of the end state of the coalition partners. This study contends that in 1813 this lead nation was the Empire of Austria, personified by Prince Clemens W. L. Von Metternich at the strategic level and Field Marshal Scwharzenberg at the operational level. These leaders effectively ensured unity of effort of a coalition plagued by an often dysfunctional command structure and disparate national interests to achieve the initial overthrow of Napoleon. Metternich laid the diplomatic groundwork at the strategic level to ensure Austrian resources were available to assure success in attaining Austria's strategic objectives. Prince Scwharzenberg persevered at the tactical and operational levels to ensure successful coalition operations and to keep the coalition focused on the overall objective at the strategic level. He achieved this despite interference from the monarchs of three great powers and the often-begrudging cooperation of the Prussian and Russian generals.
These leaders' activities during this campaign serve as models for US leaders when confronted with the challenges of coalition warfare.
IMPORTANCE OF COALITION WARFARE IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY
What does the study of a 19 th Century coalition provide for leaders confronted with 21 st Century challenges? Coalition warfare is often complex, characterized by contrasting national objectives and complicated command structures. The friction between achieving unity of command versus meeting conflicting nation's interests contributes to a constant tension that works to tear a coalition apart. Because of this constant tension, there is an overriding necessity to build consensus to keep the coalition functioning. Furthermore, slowness of execution, suppression of national objectives to meet coalition objectives, and hidden national agendas, all contribute to the complexity. Successful coalitions require a leadership style that combines persuasion, strategic vision, and unerring focus on the coalition's goal. This campaign of the 19 th century is a superb illustration of this complexity, as well as an example of a successful coalition that deserves study for applicable lessons for the 21 st century.
The United States National Security Strategy, as well as Department of Defense doctrine, acknowledges that in the future the United States will often rely on coalitions to commit military forces. In the modern international political environment coalitions help provide legitimacy to US policy objectives. Additionally, the 2002 National Security Strategy consistently highlights the importance of working within coalitions as well as international agreements to address regional security concerns that support national interests. 2 Throughout the Twentieth Century, when US forces were involved in major operations, it was as part of a coalition-normally as the leader.
Joint Doctrine specifically directs commanders to actively seek to conduct multilateral operations whenever possible. 3 In all likelihood senior, US military commanders will be forced to operate in the complex world of coalition warfare. While coalition warfare is complex, Joint Doctrine, Defense publications, and Army field manuals do address relevant tenets to guide leaders in conducting coalition warfare.
Joint Publication 3-16, Fundamentals of Multi-National Operations, details four tenets for conducting successful coalition operations. The American experience in World War II, where General Dwight D. Eisenhower felt the primary requirement for success for a coalition was "mutual confidence" strongly influenced the development of these tenets. The joint doctrine goes on to advise that to aid in establishing this confidence certain tenets are critical. This advice includes treating each coalition partner with respect, developing a professional rapport, developing knowledge of each coalition partner's strength and what they can contribute to success, and having patience in achieving results. 4 While these tenets may be important, they are primarily guidelines on how to cooperate and get along with peers. These are valuable aspects of building coalitions, but hardly sufficient to provide principles to help ensure success.
A successful coalition must have unity of effort, a strategic purpose, and a mechanism or drive to ensure the coalition remains focused on the strategic objective.
A review of successful coalitions throughout history, as well as a large body of theoretical work, also reveals that successful coalitions share the common characteristics of unity of effort, a strong strategic purpose that unites the coalition, and a sense of drive that ensures the coalition maintains its focus on the strategic objective. In studying the operations of the Sixth Coalition, Austria played the prominent role in the success of the Allies. Austria's leadership ensured unity of effort and provided the decisive resources to ensure the Allies stayed focused on the strategic objective, i.e., the defeat of Napoleon and the threat he posed to other European powers. The leaders achieved this through perseverance, the development of a feasible plan, and adherence to the plan.
Before examining Austria's role in the success of the Sixth Coalition, one needs to understand the relative failures of the coalition prior to Austria's formal entry into the operations.
The Coalition did not exercise unity of command or possess a sound operational plan until the integration of Austria into the operations. Additionally, the coalition failed to maintain unity of purpose in its operations. These elements contributed to the Coalition's failure and were evident at the tactical, as well as operational, level from the spring of 1813 until the fall of the same year. Interference from Czar Alexander of Russia, and to a lesser extent Frederick
William of Prussia, prevented the Allied command structure from effectively executing the campaign. At both the battles of Bautzen and Lutzen, as well as the maneuvering before and after each battle, the monarchs overruled the nominal military commander. This interference effectively reduced coalition effectiveness and contributed to the allied defeat in both battles. 
THE CAMAPIGN OF 1813
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN
On 1 May 1813, Napoleon advanced across the Salle River intent on moving through
Leipzig to the east and eventually through Dresden. 18 Unknown to Napoleon, the Allied army of Wittengstein with 75,000 men was southwest of his line of march arrayed near Zwenkau, with 18,000 Russians farther east. 19 The allied presence soon made itself felt.
Unable to ignore the threat to his right flank, Napoleon maneuvered and engaged the Allies at Lutzen. On 2 May, the two armies met in a meeting engagement. By the evening, the French forces on the field totaled 110,000 against the Allied army of 80,000. After fighting throughout the day, the Allies were in full retreat by 1900. Allied casualties were up to 20,000 while the French also lost about 20,000, but Napoleon clearly held the field and the initiative.
20
Napoleon had once again outmaneuvered the Allies. Caught at a disadvantage because of faulty reconnaissance due to his cavalry shortage, Napoleon quickly adjusted his tactical plan and brought more forces to the decisive field of battle before the Allies could bring their numbers to bear. The shortage of French cavalry also prevented Napoleon from mounting a decisive pursuit; nevertheless, he possessed the initiative and moved quickly to retain it. He had won the first major engagement after the disaster of Russia, and his prestige and reputation was again on the rise.
During the Allied retreat the uncertainty caused by a lack of a comprehensive operational plan emerged again. There was no guiding vision to link tactical or operational moves to achieve the strategic coalition objective of deposing Napoleon. As a result, the Allies disagreed about where the army should move in order to position itself to renew the fight. The Prussians were concerned about their capital to the north, while the Russian's line of communication ran to the east. 21 Each coalition partner allowed national interests to govern the movement of its forces instead of focusing on the strategic objective of defeating Napoleon. After much disagreement, the Allies decided that both considerations were important. As a result, Bulow's element of 30,000 Prussians screened Berlin while the majority of the allied army of 100,000 men retreated to take up a position around Bautzen, east of Dresden. When the Allies arrived in the area around Bautzen, they began fortifying their position and attempting to discern Napoleon's next move. 24 Additionally, as the Allies moved further east they shortened their line of communications to their resources and advancing reinforcements, and subsequently added the 13,000 Russians of General Barcley De Tolly's Corps to the allied army.
25
Napoleon arrived before Bautzen on 19 May and spent the day reconnoitering the strong Allied defenses and moving his army into position. The French army consisted of 115,000 men under Napoleon and 85,000 men under Ney to the north. 26 The allied army consisted of 96,200 combatants. 27 Once again, Napoleon had outmaneuvered the allied army by bringing more forces to the battlefield at the critical location to decide the campaign. Napoleon's intent was to pin the Allied army in place with a frontal attack using his main force, while Ney enveloped the allied right with his 85,000 men. The Allies planned to defend their strong, fortified position.
Once the Allies made this decision, the next critical decision was where to weight the main effort of the defense. It was in this area that the dysfunctional chain of command adversely affected the Sixth Coalition's effort. The "Commander in Chief of the Army of the Combined Allied Powers", General Wittgenstein, properly guessed that Napoleon would attack the Allied army from the north, thus forcing it to retreat toward the territory of the still neutral Austria. This in fact is what Napoleon had in mind with his maneuver from the north. He wanted to push the Allies into Austrian territory, thereby forcing the Austrians either to disarm the Allied army or to abandon their neutrality so he would know where they stood politically. At the same time, he would be in a position to threaten the Austrian capital of Vienna, which would provide him leverage to influence the Austrian decision. The next day the French continued the attack along the front expecting Ney with his 75,000 men to envelop the allied northern flank cutting off their retreat, or forcing them to the south.
However, Ney was unable to close the trap. The Allies escaped but with a loss of 20,000
combatants. Once again, Napoleon was not able to aggressively pursue the defeated army due to his shortage of cavalry. 30 Much like Lutzen, the battle of Bautzen was a French victory illustrating the French tactical prowess without accomplishing the decisive results Napoleon needed. More importantly, it showed that the Allies were still unable to defeat Napoleon without a significant resource advantage.
In defeat once again, the tensions of national interests threatened the unity of the Sixth Coalition. The Prussian generals wanted to retreat to a position to better defend Prussia and Berlin. Conversely, the Russian generals wanted to retreat into Poland. 31 The disagreements over the proper operational move once again resulted in the intervention of Czar Alexander.
This was the final insult to General Wittgenstein. He resigned his position as commander, and Russian General Barcley de Tolley assumed responsibility of the Allied armies. Wittgenstein's resignation was due to Alexander's constant interference at both Bautzen and during the retreat.
Soon after his appointment as Allied commander, Barcley de Tolley argued with Blucher over the proper route of retreat and, once again, the Czar intervened. The army retired to Silesia where it could maintain contact with the still neutral Austria and maintain the façade of protecting Prussia.
32
The Sixth Coalition had lost another major battle against Napoleon. Napoleon accomplished this with local superiority of forces at the critical time on the battlefield and demonstrated once again that he was tactically and operationally superior to any individual commander in the coalition. The sustained bickering, arguments, and disagreements at Allied Headquarters continued to hinder effective Allied operations. Until it could bring overwhelming resources to bear at the strategic and operational levels, the coalition was at risk of losing any future confrontation. Furthermore, the coalition needed a sound plan to translate the strategic objective of defeating Napoleon to operational success.
THE SUMMER ARMISTICE
After six weeks of maneuvering and numerous battles across central Europe, both the Allies and the French were exhausted. Both sides were ready for a respite and signed an armistice 2 June, which the antagonists extended until 20 July and once again until 10 August 1813.
33
The diplomatic outcome of the armistice was the most important result of the pause and significantly altered the balance of power in Central Europe. Austria joined the Sixth Coalition and provided the coalition with the overwhelming resources needed to defeat Napoleon.
However, the real activities occurred while the armed hostilities were still taking place. Prior to the armistice, the diplomatic maneuvering resulted in the Treaty of Reichenbach, which
Metternich signed on 14 June 1813. By the conditions of the treaty, Austria agreed to present a set of terms to Napoleon, and more importantly, to undertake armed action against Napoleon in the event that he refused the terms. 34 Metternich presented the conditions to Napoleon, and after much debate and counter proposals, the Allies and Napoleon could not agree to terms.
This resulted in Austria joining the armed conflict against Napoleon on 12 August 1813, although the Austrians did not have a formal alliance with either Prussia or Russia. Metternich wanted to maintain Austria's flexibility to eventually mediate the conflict and not completely isolate Austria from France.
35
At the conclusion of the armistice in August 1813, the Allies were numerically superior to the French throughout the theater. With the addition of Austria and Sweden, the Allied army consisted of 570,000 effectives. Napoleon had used the time to replenish his losses from the spring campaign and mustered 442,000 soldiers. 36 The ultimate strength of the coalition lay in its reserves. The Allies could call on an additional 500,000 soldiers while Napoleon had virtually drained France's manpower pool in his effort to replenish his armies after 1812 and 1813. 37 The
Allies finally had strategic numerical superiority. Additionally, the loyalty of many of Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine allies was suspect. With this numerical superiority, the Allies still 
Trachenberg Convention
Convention signed at Trachenberg, 12 th of July, 1813, as a basis for the Operations of the Campaign.
The following general principles have been decided: the Allied forces will always cut as direct as possible the enemy forces. As a consequence:
1. The corps which have to conduct operations on the enemy flanks or read will always cut as direct as possible the enemy line of operations.
2. The larger Allied force must select a position which enables it to face the enemy wherever he advances. The salient of Bohemia seems to be proper to enable it. According to this principle, the combined armies will have to occupy the following positions before the end of armistice:
A part of the Allied army in Silesia (98,000 to 100,000) will join as soon as possible, by the routes between Landshut and Gratz, the Austrian Army in order to form with it a 200,000 to 220,000 strength force in Bohemia.
The Army of the Crown Prince of Sweden, while leaving a 15,000 to 20,000 strength Corps screening the Danish and French from Lubeck and Hamburg, will mass approximately 70,000 troops near Trauenbrutzen. As soon as the armistice comes to an end, this Army will cross the Elbe River between Torgau and Magdebourg, then moves toward Leipzig.
The rest of the Allied Army in Silasia, with 50,000 soldiers, will follow the enemy towards the Elbe River. This army will avoid committing itself except in the case of an extremely favorable situation. Once on the Elbe River, this force will try to cross the river between Torgau and Dresden in order to join the Crown Prince of Sweden's Army. The strength will be therefore 120,000 troops. If however, there is a need to reinforce the Allied Army in Bohemia, this Army, instead of joining the Swedish Army, will quickly move to Bohemia.
The Austrian part of the Allied force will advance either by Eger of by Hoff, or in Saxony, Silesia, or along the Danube.
If the Emperor NAPOLEON decides to march to fight the Bohemian Army, the Crown Prince of Sweden's Army will try as quick as possible to reach the enemy's rear. If, on the contrary, Napoleon moves toward the Swedish Army, the Allied Army will conduct a vigorous offensive operation though the enemy communications to join the battle. All the armies will make the enemy camp the point of rendezvous.
The Russian Army (Reserve) led by General Bennigsen will move from the Vistula River to the Older River by Kalish in the direction of Glogau in order to be capable of moving towards the enemy if he stays in SILESIA, or denying him the ability to invade Poland. The new supreme commander's talents were, to be sure, more diplomatic then strictly military, and it was probably a good thing that this was so. Like Dwight D. Eisenhower in another great coalition a hundred and thirty years later, his great gift was his ability, by patience and the arts in ingratiation, to hold together a military alliance, which before Napoleon was defeated comprised fourteen members, and to persuade quarrelling monarchs and their field commanders to give more then lip service to the alliance's strategical plan. After listening to the dissenting views Schwarzenberg agreed to call off the attack, but it was too late. Schwarzenberg had issued orders for the attack earlier in the morning, and as the monarchs bickered, the cannonade to announce the attack commenced. The result of the frontal assault on a prepared position was a resounding defeat for the Allies. Allied losses were 38,000, while the French only lost about 10,000. August, General Vandamme attempted to cut off the allied retreat to the south from Dresden. In the resulting engagement at Kulm, the Allies totally isolated Vandamme's Corps and destroyed it, capturing the General. 51 The allied successes continued into the month of September.
Crown Prince Charles defeated Marshal Ney, who had replaced Marshal Oudinot, on 6
September at the Battle of Denniwitz, as the French attempted another drive on Berlin.
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Because of these victories over a short time period, the entire campaign shifted in the favor of the Allies both physically and mentally. Allied morale improved, while morale within the French ranks declined. General Von Gersdorf, a Saxon on the French staff, sums up the impact of these losses on the atmosphere at Napoleon's Headquarters.
The impression made by the successes at Dresden and Moreou's death have been wiped out; all consequences these events might have entailed are simply destroyed. Confidence grows in the camp of the Allies in proportion as it sinks with us. The Emperor is very quite; I hardly like to write 'depressed' but very pensive, curiously he is not irritable; the spirit of Headquarters generally bears the stamp of time.
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In addition to the morale consequences of the defeat of the smaller French forces, there were operational effects. The Army of Bohemia escaped Napoleon's attempted encirclement.
Furthermore, the Army of the North advanced from Berlin to the south and Blucher's Army of Silisia advanced from the east toward Dresden. Napoleon's tactical victory of Dresden became an operational failure due to the allied victories over elements on the flanks and rear of the main army. The Allies were reducing the operational area, restricting Napoleon's room to maneuver.
The victories of the allies on the flanks and rear of Napoleon's main army proved the viability of the Trachenberg Plan.
During September the situation continued to favor the Allies. They operated on exterior lines while continuing to shrink the operational area around Napoleon, and added 60,000
Russian soldiers under General Bennigsen. 54 For the first time in the campaign, the Allies took the initiative and implemented an operational plan with the intention of directly confronting Napoleon personally to force a decisive battle. Schwarzenberg was maintaining the unity of effort in the campaign by directly focusing the coalition forces on defeating Napoleon in the classic "Napoleonic decisive battle". His plan called for the major portion of the Allied force to position itself west of Napoleon's main army, cutting off his lines of communication to France and compelling a battle.
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During September, Schwarzenberg attempted to cross the Bohemian mountains and cut off Napoleon's communications to France, but Napoleon reacted to prevent this. Despite this setback in the south, the Allies were able to make progress in the east as Blucher pushed
Macdonald's army to the west toward Dresden. 56 Napoleon still enjoyed interior lines from his base of operations at Dresden with the Allies to the north, south, and east; however, the Allies continued to tighten the noose around Napoleon's young army. At first glance, it appears that there was no progress in the later part of September. The Allies were still along exterior lines with Napoleon enjoying the operational interior lines-a perceived advantage for the French.
However, the constant marching from one part of the operational area to another was having a debilitating effect on Napoleon and his army. The Trachenberg Plan was working despite Schwarzenberg's retreat to the south.
Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia was south of Dresden with 220,000 men. Blucher with 70,000 men was located near Bautzen and the Army of the North, consisting of 80,000 men, remained north of Wittenberg after its defeat of Marshal Ney's force on 6 September. 57 By the end of September Schwarzenberg decided that the Allies had enough numerical superiority to defeat Napoleon.
As Bennigsen approached Schwarzenberg's control, the Austrian General decided that the Army of Bohemia should move once again to threaten Napoleon's lines of communications by moving to Baireuth by way of Hof. 58 He began this movement on 26 September to threaten Napoleon's southern flank. Additionally, as this was occurring Blucher would move to his right and join his forces with those of Crown Prince Charles north of Napoleon's main army. By 3
FIGURE 5
October, Blucher with 63,000 men had reached the convergence of the Elbe and Black River. 
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The decisive event of the 1813 campaign was the Battle of Leipzig, which occurred [16] [17] [18] [19] October. The Allies were able to engage Napoleon with 365,000 men and 1,500 pieces of artillery, compared to his 195,000 men and 700 pieces of artillery. that the other powers would not agree to the proposals but also understood they would buy time for Austria to prepare her army. Additionally, unlike Britain and Prussia, Metternich did not believe that Napoleon had to be removed from the French throne to meet Austria's objectives.
He was more concerned with the domination of either Prussia or Russia in the emerging struggle over the former states of the Confederation of the Rhine.
These proposals were incredibly demanding, and if achieved would clearly address the objectives of the Austrian Empire. Metternich was able to make these demands because he assessed that he had the means in the Austrian Army to achieve the goals of his nation, if he could stall using diplomacy long enough to prepare that Army. He linked the advantage the large Austro-Hungarian army gave him to the diplomatic tool of power. Playing the Coalition against Napoleon suited Austria's needs until she was certain that her mediation could not obtain her objectives.
Austria played the neutrality game masterfully in 1813 exercising her diplomatic element of national power. She had offered to mediate the conflict between France and Russia in December 1812. there is no credible evidence to support the belief that Napoleon would not have continued to win major operationally significant battles and ultimately "wear down" the determination of the coalition members. The Austrian resources were the decisive element tilting the balance of power in favor of the Sixth Coalition. When the Austrians formally joined the coalition, it was the first time in the Napoleonic wars that three major continental powers opposed Napoleon at the same time. The Coalition had such an advantage of resources that it could even afford minor mistakes and disagreements, as long as it maintained its focus on the defeat of Napoleon.
Even the military genius of one of history's greatest captains could not overcome these tremendous odds indefinitely. The principle of attrition, as embodied in the Trachenburg Plan, proved to be an appropriate operational way to achieve the objective of overthrowing Napoleon given the means the Allies had at their disposal. The Sixth Coalition included Britain, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, several Minor German states and Austria. Each of the major powers brought several strengths to the coalition that effectively contributed to the success of the partnership. However, they also brought their own national interests, and agendas, which conversely pulled the coalition apart. Nevertheless, the one uniting factor in cementing the coalition to a common cause was the threat Napoleon poised to each of the coalition members. Austria's senior leaders were able to maintain the focus of the coalition on defeating Napoleon. Despite the frustration of dissenting opinions and bickering from monarchs and other senior leaders, Prince Metternich and Schwarzenberg were able to keep the coalition together. While Schwarzenberg was never able to achieve unity of command he was able to maintain unity of effort. US leaders will likely be faced with the same challenges in the future. As our national leaders form coalitions, these coalitions will include nations whose policy goals are not one hundred percent in line with our nation's goals.
Maintaining unity of effort in these circumstances will ensure success despite the intricacies of the command structure.
Because of the preeminence of the United States in the international community, US military leaders will most likely operate as the senior leader in any major operation the US undertakes in the near future. We will not participate in major operations providing the majority of forces without maintaining the preponderance of authority within the partnership. Because of contending objectives and often-disparate interests of coalition partners, coalitions are routinely faced with immense tensions. These tensions tend to pull the coalition apart as the threat they face lessens and partners pursue their own national interests at the cost of coalition objectives.
Conversely, coalition partners tend to come together when the threat reemerges or gains the advantage. US leaders, as representatives of the senior partner, need to understand this dynamic and prepare themselves to operate in this complex environment. They also need to keep in mind as the senior coalition partner US leaders are expected to maintain unity of effort within the coalition while keeping the focus on the coalition objectives in order to support US interests.
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